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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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DATE: 13 August 1946

FROM : Security Division, SSU

SUBJECT: S. O. Security

1. There are basically two ways of approaching the security problem of any organization dealing with classified information and activities: (a) as a corrective function, intended to recoup situations which have become insecure through operational requirements; and (b) as a preventive function, intended to anticipate operational requirements, and to tailor the security services so as to facilitate, not hamper, the fulfillment of those requirements. Approach (b) is obviously the desirable one; it requires, however, participation of the Security Office in the planning stages of operational work. With regard to the Security Division, CIG, this applies to all domestic CIG activities. It is not enough that security be considered during the planning stages; it is necessary that the Security Division, as the office charged with maintaining security, have a hand in devising those activities which have extensive security implications.

2. With regard to servicing the activities of S. O., I feel that the security effort should not be diluted by establishing a completely separate security office. To do so would segregate S. O. activities effectively from the rest of CIG, it is true, and such segregation should be sought, but not as the primary security objective. Any such completely isolated unit would be: (a) extremely vulnerable to outside observation and speculation; and (b) basically insecure, once the inevitable pattern of activity had established itself. Because the value of investigative work is largely dependent on the extent to which investigative liaison can be carried on, a separate unit, committed to supporting only S. O., would be prevented by security itself from providing a real investigative service. However, within the framework of the Security Division, CIG, the specialized requirements of S. O. could be given separate treatment, to protect the integrity of S. O. activities within CIG, and yet lose these significant matters in the much greater routine traffic carried on by the Security Division, CIG. Therefore, I believe that the Chief, Security Division, CIG, should be personally responsible to the Assistant Director for Special Operations for fulfillment of the general requirements of the latter, but that the Chief, Security Division, CIG, should be free to work out the details of such performance within the framework of his own methods and techniques.

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
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3. With particular regard for the activities of "B" Deputy, attached will be found a paper dealing with some of those security considerations which will confront the "B" Deputy.



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Lt. Col., QMC,
Chief, Security Division.

I agree
Q